California’s Song-Beverly Act is a consumer protection law covering all consumer goods, including motor vehicles. In the motor vehicle context, the Song-Beverly Act is frequently referred to as California’s “lemon law.” The act creates rules governing warranties on consumer goods and outlines the penalties for breaching both express and implied warranties. This article will address key issues that arise in the defense of lemon law cases and tips for dealing with them during the course of litigation.

Click here to continue reading article.

Attire Before a Jury

Judges have more discretion to control an attorney’s appearance in the context of a jury trial. A California court upheld a trial judge’s authority to request that a female attorney remove an inappropriate hat. In that case, the trial judge merely requested, in front of the jury, that the attorney remove the hat because it was a distraction to the jurors. The attorney moved for a mistrial based on the judge’s suggestion. The reviewing court noted: “Parading a freakish hat before a jury could only be characterized as pure exhibitionism and courtroom exhibitionism indulged in by either men or women lawyers is a type of aberration which merits only disapproval.” People v. Rainey 224 Cal. App. 2d 93, 97 (1964). Similarly, a New York case upheld a trial judge’s order that an attorney, who was also a Catholic priest, remove his clerical garb before appearing before the jury in a criminal trial. The attorney, who represented the defendant, contended that the trial judge’s order violated his First Amendment right to free exercise of religion. The appellate court noted that the guarantee of a fair trial is so fundamental, that the court’s order must be upheld and to do otherwise would potentially subject the defendant to religious prejudice. LaRocca v. Lane 37, NY 2d 575 (1974).

Attire at Bench Trials and Hearings

Attorneys do not surrender all Constitutional rights upon entering the courtroom and an attorney arguably has more freedom to dress as he or she pleases outside of the jury’s presence. For example, a San Diego Superior Court judge informed a plaintiff’s attorney that he could not appear before the court wearing a turban unless he demonstrated a legitimate reason for wearing it. Absent a showing that the turban interfered with justice in the courtroom, the appellate court granted the attorney’s writ of mandamus permitting him to appear before the judge in the turban, without explaining its purpose. The court commented: “We hold to the belief no person need declare his or her faith, or lack of it, to engage in the practice of law. Courtroom inquisition concerning physical condition or cosmetic appearance is an invasion of privacy.” Jensen v. Superior Court of San Diego County, et al. 154 Cal. App. 3d 533, 541 (1984).

Conclusion

Judges are entitled to require attorneys to dress formally for court appearances and may require that attorneys avoid wearing articles of clothing that distract or interfere with the administration of justice in the court room. Courtroom rules that fall reasonably under these principles appear to commonly be upheld by higher courts. Because courts are governmental bodies, however, that line may be crossed when any courtroom rule restricts an attorney’s ability to wear religious garb, as such a rule may violate an attorney’s Constitutional rights.

Of course, an attorney’s personal taste may be outweighed by the interest of his or her client if the attorney’s appearance may prejudice the client. As most judges require that attorneys dress in business attire in their courtrooms, conservative dress, which may or may not include pantsuits for women, is generally the best way to avoid the wrath of a fashion conscious judge.